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Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the recording or publication of
jury deliberations. As with any other judicial function in our democratic
society, the public relies on the work and product of the jury to ensure that
justice is done. Unlike any other governmental deliberative process, jury
deliberations receive unparalleled protection from the glare of the public
eye. An increasing mistrust of the jury has resulted from public displeasure
with the results in high profile cases. In addition, access to jurors and the
contents of the deliberative process is increasing through the prevalence of
postverdict interviews. When freely given, the First Amendment almost
insurmountably protects this post-verdict testimony.
Under a contemporary reading of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,1 faithful to one prong of that majority opinion,2 and in
*J.D. 2005, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 1992, Bard College. I am
particularly grateful for the assistance of Professor Fred Cate, who was invaluable as a critic
of this Comment. I wish also to acknowledge the support of the staff of the Federal
Communications Law Journal.
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. The most substantive explication of this "logic" or "structural" prong came from
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers. Justice Brennan wrote:
[Tjhe First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
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consideration of the current "treatment" of jury anonymity,3 a limited right
of access should attach to jury deliberations after the end of trial. This right
of access should be subject to limitations designed to protect both
defendants' fair trial rights and juror privacy and safety.4
Discretion whether to permit access to deliberations would thus
inhere in much the same way it does in the context of media access to
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. Implicit in this
structural role is not only 'the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' but also the antecedent assumption that
valuable public debate--as well as other civic behavior--must be informed. The
structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.
Id. 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It is arguable that
the Court moved closer toward this single-pronged focus in Globe Newspapers Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982) ("Whether the First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials can be restricted in the context of any particular criminal trial, such
as a murder trial (the setting for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial,
depends not on the historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state
interests assertedly supporting the restriction.") (emphasis added). See also Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court (Press Enter If), 478 U.S. 1, 21 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
historical evidence proffered in this case is far less probative than the evidence adduced in
prior cases granting public access to criminal proceedings."); El Vocero de Puerto Rico v.
Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (holding that despite no history of openness, access
attached). For an exhaustive survey of Justice Brennan's contribution, and how it extended
from the First Amendment scholarship of Alexander Meiklejohn, see generally Eugene
Cerutti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New
Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 269 (1995):
In most respects, [the two-prong test] fails to justify the extraordinary extension of
the right of access to proceedings and documents with no real history of access
and no real utility to the governing process. Many [lower] courts have in fact quite
explicitly forsaken the two-prong standard while at the same time extending the
right.
(citations omitted); cf. Clifford Holt Ruprecht, Are Verdicts, Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting
the Cloak of Jury Secrecy, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 237-41 (1997).
3. The historical model of access-"experience"-fails to address modem advances in
media culture. Increased access suggests that more and not less information should be
available; the reasons for limiting access to jury deliberations are no longer held sacrosanct
either by the courts or by the public at large. If the reasons are no longer persuasive, then the
question of access to jury deliberations needs to be recast to address that reality. See
generally Cerutti, supra note 2 (arguing that the right of access needs to be restructured in
the interests of doctrinal integrity to account for vast expansions and address claims for
more openness in government).
4. Nothing in this proposal implicates the rules prohibiting impeachment of jury
verdicts as a legal or judicial matter, nor violates historical concern for jury privacy in the
deliberative process. If necessary, juror privacy may still be maintained through the use of
various technical or legal devices. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 488 U.S. at 580-81, and
its progeny; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (considering
restrictions on access when prejudice or disadvantage might otherwise follow).
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judicial proceedings generally.5 This approach would serve as a basis for
demystifying the jury process while educating the public and increasing its
confidence in the jury system. Furthermore, a right of access to jury
deliberations might lessen the incentive for publicity-hungry media to
harass and intimidate individual jurors. Finally, and over time, the
publication of jury deliberations, and the accompanying scrutiny by the
public, scholars, and bar, might produce better juries, resulting from a
broad and informed solemnity for the jury process.6
This Comment argues that transcripts of jury deliberations, subject to
the same balancing exercised by judges in the context of access to judicial
proceedings, should be routinely accessible after trial. These transcripts
could preserve juror anonymity through the use of codes or numbers to
distinguish, but not personally identify, individual jurors. Further, and
subject to the consent of the defendant and the jury, audio and visual
records of jury deliberations should be permitted, subject to judicial
discretion similar to that exercised in the context of televisions in the
courtrooms.7 Additional mechanisms are proposed to mitigate concerns that
these recordings would skew the composition of the jury. At no point does
this Comment argue that transcripts or audiovisual records should be
subject to judicial review, form the basis for appellate litigation, or disturb
the common law and statutory prohibitions on the impeachment of jury
5. A limited right of access in this context
may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that [post-trial]
closure [of that record] is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated long with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order
was properly entered.
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enter 1), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). In the context
of access to the transcript of jury deliberations, a general and unarticulated reference to
"jury privacy" would not alone suffice to justify presumptive closure of the jury record.
6. See generally Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-
Verdict Interviews of Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REv. 465, 498-501 (1997) (suggesting that access
might increase accountability and cause juries to take their work more seriously); Kenneth
B. Nunn, When Juries Meet the Press: Rethinking the Jury's Representative Function in
Highly Publicized Cases, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405, 434 (1995) (arguing in the context
of the "Jury's New Representative Function," that "[tihe more public the workings of a jury
are, the more likely the community will be to fulfill its role as an arbiter of disputes and
accept jury conclusions."). But see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. The right of access does not attach to recording devices in courtrooms-required
access involves merely allowing media to be present during trial proceedings and to inspect
court documents related to those proceedings. See Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 610 (1978), where the Court stated:
Nor does the Sixth Amendment require that the trial--or any part of it-be
broadcast live or on tape to the public. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied
by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to
report what they have observed.
Number 11
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verdicts.8
Part I of the Comment explores the constitutional provisions relevant
to access to jury deliberations. Part II outlines the common law traditions
regarding access to jury deliberations, specifically impeachment of jury
verdicts and the protection of jury privacy. Part II explores the dangers
associated with access to jury deliberations, concluding that such concerns
are ultimately unpersuasive in the postverdict setting, and in light of
already existing practices that compromise the privacy of the jury. In either
case, the concern for jury privacy should otherwise be subordinated to the
public benefits from a limited right of access. Part IV suggests a framework
for limited access to jury deliberations that satisfies most of the historical
concerns for jury privacy and concludes with an argument that limited
access to jury deliberations might result in an increased and informed
solemnity for the function of the jury. A Postscript addresses the particular
case of audiovisual recording devices in the jury room.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND ACCESS TO JURY DELIBERATIONS
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the recording of jury
deliberations. 9 Nevertheless, any positive theory of access to jury
deliberations must be grounded in that text in order to mitigate the ongoing
and inevitable legislative attempts to bar such access.10 Additionally, such a
8. This position contrasts with other arguments for access posed previously, which
suggest that judicial, preverdict inquiry should be encouraged and permitted in order to
ensure that juries are performing their duties consistent with their commitments. See, e.g.,
Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495,
1502 (2001) (arguing for a balance between "jury secrecy" and "judicial inquiry" in the
preverdict context, which errs toward more inquiry in order to permit impartial inquiry into
ongoing jury deliberations). But see United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 623 (2d Cir.
1997):
[W]e are compelled to err in favor of the lesser of two evils-protecting the
secrecy of jury deliberations at the expense of possibly allowing irresponsible
juror activity. Achieving a more perfect system for monitoring the conduct of
jurors in the intense environment of a jury deliberation room entails an
unacceptable breach of the secrecy that is essential to the work of juries in the
American system of justice. To open the door to the deliberation room any more
widely and provide opportunities for broad-ranging judicial inquisitions into the
thought processes of jurors would, in our view, destroy the jury system itself.
Case law and conventional wisdom, which insist that juries follow instructions, would seem
to support a vision that the integrity of the jury is challenged more by preverdict judicial
inquiry than by postverdict public access; particularly upon the assumption that finality of
the verdict cannot be challenged. In any event, the competing interests at stake in the
preverdict and postverdict settings are sufficiently distinct as to preclude analogy.
9. The realities of the modem context advise that the trend of the federal-if not
state-courts is away from access in the context of judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, the
absence of constitutional text bearing on the question of restricting access-versus
affirmative access, however limited-is evidence that the question remains open and vital.
10. TX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 36.215 and 36.22 (Vernon 1981) (prohibiting
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theory of access must account for constitutional provisions, which, in the
context of access to jury deliberations, might be used to affirmatively bar or
severely limit such access. Once a limited right of access attaches, similar
findings and devices, balanced against the right of access in order to justify
closure of courtroom proceedings,"' can be implemented to mitigate any
constitutional privacy or fair-trial implications that arise in the context of
access to jury deliberations.
A qualified right of access attaches to judicial proceedings through
the First and Sixth Amendments. The Court in Richmond Newspapers
found that "the right to attend... trials is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials,. . . important
aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscerated.""
'
,
2
The Court also found that in the absence of identifiable prejudice to the
defendant this right of access trumped the defendant's right to a fair trial as
protected by the Sixth Amendment.' 3 Further, the defendant's right to a
public trial did not include the negative right to a private trial. 14 Finally, the
Court recognized that in the modem era, the public receives most of their
information from the media, which acts as a proxy for the public.'
5
In order to determine whether a right of access attached to judicial
proceedings, the Court looked to both logic, the "community therapeutic
value" of openness, and experience-whether the trial proceedings in
question had historically been opened to the public. 16 However, implicit in
the Court's opinion are two concerns: (1) the media increasingly functions
any recording of jury deliberations, and provides that "[n]o person shall be permitted to be
with a jury while it is deliberating"). See also Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) (codifying the
impeachment doctrine).
11. When "a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches ... the proceedings
cannot be closed unless specific, on-the-record findings are made demonstrating that
'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."' Press Enter 11, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Press Enter 1, 464 U.S. at 510). In
Richmond Newspapers, the Court asserted that lower courts must: (1) make specific and on-
the-record findings; (2) investigate less restrictive alternatives to closure; and, (3) identify
the constitutional right of access and balance the findings against that right. 488 U.S. at
580-81 ("[T]he trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made as to
whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness; there was no
recognition of any right under the Constitution for the public or press to attend the trial.").
12. 448 U.S. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). The Court
found that this guarantee encompassed each of the specific rights to speech, press and
assembly. Id. at 575-78.
13. Id. at 580-81.
14. Id. at 580.
15. Id. at 577 n.12; see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609 ("Since the press serves as the
information-gathering agent of the public, it [can] not be prevented from reporting what it
ha[s] learned and what the public [ius entitled to know."). But see Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-835 (1974).
16. 448 U.S. at 570.
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as a proxy for the public and as a check on and observer of government,
specifically judicial proceedings; and (2) because of the nature of modem
society, where individuals have neither the time nor the proximity to
courthouses in order to participate, a more fundamental right of access was
needed in order to accommodate and facilitate scrutiny of judicial
proceedings.
In this way, Richmond Newspapers seems to assert that, in
consideration of the public's alienation from the trial experience, a right of
access must now attach as an indispensable element of an "informed"
democracy, necessary to the "enjoyment of [those constitutional] rights
explicitly defined." 17 Viewed in the context of subsequent case law,
18
focusing more specifically on the logic prong, Richmond Newspapers can
be viewed as a fundamental decision that unlocked the door and grounded
the right of access as an indispensable element of modem democracy, a
"categorical assurance of the.., freedom of access to information" in the
judicial setting.' 9 And the parameters of this right of access must shift with
other developments in modern life. Indeed, just as technology will open
new and less intrusive avenues to access, the Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized that the doctrine of access will similarly accompany such
changes.2° In this sense, the right of access will come to play "a structural
role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.",2' And this right of access, to gather information, will not be
17. Id. at 580.
18. See, e.g., Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (right of
access attaches to testimony of rape-victim minors, even though historically closed); Press
Enter I1, 478 U.S. at 9 (right of access attaches to preliminary proceedings in California,
even though historically closed); In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) (resolving
persistent claims to secrecy within the appellate process); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d
354, 363 (5th Cir.1983) ("[T]he lack of an historic tradition ... does not bar ... a right of
access."). See also Cerutti, supra note 2, at 280 (highlighting the structural prong of
Richmond Newspapers and asserting that this prong has been "significantly extended by the
lower courts").
19. 448 U.S. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring). The primacy of this structural analysis is
evident in the majority's citation to Jeremy Bentham:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all
other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions
might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate
rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.
Id. at 569 (quoting I J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)).
20. "When the advances in these arts permit reporting ... by television without [its]
present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965). See also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (overruling Estes in everything
but name).
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Indeed, the majority was explicit in this regard:
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meeting" form of trial became
[Vol. 58
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subordinated to the rights or interests of the parties or of the courts except
on particularized findings that prejudice will inhere.
Constitutional provisions that might insulate or bear on the roles of
jurors and jury are not sufficient to trump the right of access to gather
information. A constitutional right of privacy does not attach to the
deliberations of the jury, nor does such a right attach for the individual.
Indeed, absent articulable findings as to possible danger to jury safety, juror
identity is part of the public record generated during trial proceedings.22
Such concerns for privacy are generally satisfied through enforcement of
common law protections of jury secrecy. Alternately, the First Amendment
affords almost complete protection for postverdict speech by individual
jurors.23 Indeed, the increase and profile of postverdict interviews in the
media today is some evidence both that juror secrecy is no longer
sacrosanct in our culture and that limited access to jury deliberations is
both desirable and necessary to an informed democracy, albeit one where
the distinction between entertainment and news has been significantly
eroded.24
Finally, any right of access to jury deliberations, as protected by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, might impair the defendant's right to a fair
trial-specifically as fairness is implicated by jury privacy in deliberations.
As Justice Cardozo opined, "For the origin of the privilege we are referred
to ancient usage, and for its defense to public policy. Freedom of debate
too cumbersome, 12 members of the community were delegated to act as its
surrogates, but the community did not surrender its right to observe the conduct of
trials. The people retained a "right of visitation" which enabled them to satisfy
themselves that justice was in fact being done. People in an open society do not
demand infallibilityfrom their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the
open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the system in general
and its workings in a particular case ....
Id. at 572. Cf. Cerutti, supra note 2.
22. In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1988) the court stated:
We recognize the difficulties which may exist in highly publicized trials such as
the case being tried here and the pressures upon jurors. But we think the risk of
loss of confidence of the public in the judicial process is too great to permit a
criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may maintain anonymity.
If the district court thinks that the attendant dangers of a highly publicized trial are
too great, it may always sequester the jury; and change of venue is always
possible as a method of obviating pressure or prejudice.
See also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (realistic threats to juror
safety or jury corruption were compelling reasons sufficient to warrant protection of juror
identity).
23. But see In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating in
dicta that jurors could be prohibited from disclosing individual votes of other jurors).
24. See Markovitz, supra note 8, at 1514 ("IT]he extensive postverdict disclosure of
jury deliberations makes it likely that jurors already enter deliberations with the
understanding that their discussion may become public at some point.") (emphasis added).
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might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made
to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the
world."25The argument follows that, if jurors were aware in advance of the
verdict that their deliberations were to be disseminated to the public, their
ability to remain free of influence (neighbors, parties, media) and to
deliberate freely would be affected, possibly affecting defendant's right to a
fair trial. Given that the right to a fair trial is owned by a defendant, and
post-verdict release of jury transcripts might be said to impair that right, a
"knowing and intelligent" waiver by the defendant could cure this
concern.
26
Nevertheless, the suggestion that postverdict release of jury
deliberations might have more affect than media presence and reporting
during the trial and after the verdict is not persuasive.27 Indeed, arguments
against postverdict access to jury deliberations are purely speculative,28 and
sound ominously familiar to the "parade of horribles" hypothesized in the
wake of the early placement of televisions in courtrooms. 29 Empirical data
confirming that juries will be chilled by postverdict access to their
deliberations is neither available nor logically sustainable given both the
informal access already generated through interviews and the relative
ambivalence to televisions in the courtrooms.
Further, once the jury's work is complete, who "owns" the trial
proceedings and the jury verdict? If we are to take the right of access and
25. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
26. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Brady, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970); cf. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
27. A more thorough exploration of this issue will have to await publication of
empirical studies. For the purposes of this Comment, I argue that specific parameters for
postverdict release-juror anonymity, sufficient time lapse between verdict and release-
satisfy those concerns for privacy that might otherwise interfere or balance against a
constitutional right of access necessary for an informed democracy.
28. See Abraham Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict
Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 295, 307-08, 314 (1993) (arguing without support that "the
defendant's right to a fair trial-by a jury confident that its deliberations will remain
secret-is seriously threatened when jurors expect that they will have to face the media, or
that their fellow jurors will talk to the media." Further, the expectation of such access "will
affect how freely [the jurors] talk to each other; it will make them feel visible to the world
and accountable as individuals, not as a body."). In the words of the same author, "these are
the grossest of speculations." Id. at 313. Indeed, the parameters here proposed on access
might mitigate the inevitable effects already present from current forms of access-
dissemination of transcripts with anonymous identities may actually increase our
understanding of the jury as a "body," and not a rag-tag gathering of "individuals."
29. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 546, where the Court stated:
It is the awareness of the fact of telecasting that is felt by the juror throughout the
trial. We are self-conscious and uneasy when being televised. Human nature being
what it is, not only will the juror's eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind
will be preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony.
[Vol. 58
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its intended use to foster and sustain an informed democracy, then "[a] trial
is a public event. What transpires in the court room [and in the jury room]
is public property. '30 By analogy, and recognizing the need for jury privacy
during deliberations, a right of access that attaches after the release of a
verdict, is consistent both with tradition and with the need to know what
attaches to any governmental or judicial process. Indeed, "[h]istory ha[s]
proven that secret tribunals [are] effective instruments of oppression.'
31
In the context of media access to judicial proceedings, resolution
depends upon a balance between speech, societal interest in the
proceedings, increasing public confidence in the judicial process, and a
defendant's right to a fair trial. While the defendant's right to a fair trial is
arguably implicated by postverdict access to jury deliberations, in the
absence of particularized findings and mindful of special parameters for
release of this information, such a right should be subordinated to the
postverdict right of access to jury deliberations.
II. THE JURY AND THE COMMON LAW
Critical to identifying a postverdict right of access to jury
deliberations while maintaining allegiance to the common law traditions of
jury secrecy is the unrecognized and central distinction between
contemporaneous access to jury deliberations and subsequent access to a
jury verdict, owned by the public as an expression and representation of our
system of justice. The model of access proposed here in no way subverts or
challenges the common law traditions of jury privacy that have thus far
served as an almost impenetrable barrier to disturbing the finality of the
verdict itself. Indeed, the structural model of access above identifies the
public as the political body to scrutinize the work of juries, and neither
allows for even limited judicial review of these transcripts for the purposes
of inquiring into jury deliberations, nor provides a means by which to
challenge those verdicts (either post-trial or on appeal).32
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) codified the long-standing common
law proposition that jurors may not impeach their own verdict.3 3 Rule
30. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
31. Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
32. But see Ruprecht, supra note 2 (arguing that limited judicial review-not public
access-should flow as the appropriate "check" on jury deliberations). If any limited
judicial review should attach, the appropriate context would be the penalty phase of a death
penalty case, where the jury is asked to "weigh" aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in order to determine whether the defendant is death-eligible. The danger for misconduct or
extraneous influence in this context is extreme and might warrant inquiry sufficient to
determine whether the jury behaved irresponsibly.
33. See, e.g., 8 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2352, pp. 696-97 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (1904) (explaining that the rule originated from an opinion by Lord Mansfield in 1785
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606(b) provides that a juror may not testify on the subject of deliberations
to impeach the finality of the verdict, "except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 34 The most recent
interpretation of this doctrine came in Tanner v. United States,35 where the
Court refused to inquire into jury deliberations despite evidence that the
jurors had been doing drugs and drinking alcohol throughout the trial and
during deliberations. 36 Notwithstanding the reasonableness of this decision,
the Court's concern focused on "the finality of the process, 37 and the
safety of the verdict as it related to the continued vitality of the jury system
as a means to administer justice. The Court's concern with juror privacy
in this context represents a policy choice between "redressing the injury of
the private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result if
and "came to receive in the United States an adherence almost unquestioned.").
34. FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
35. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
36. In terms of evaluating whether a verdict should be scrutinized, the Court fashioned
from prior case law a sharp distinction between external and internal influences. See
generally Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1896) ("a juryman may testify to any
facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as
to how far that influence operated upon his mind.") (quoting Woodward v. Leavitt, 107
Mass. 453, 466 (1871)).
37. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
38. Id. ("There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would
in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper
juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts
to perfect it."). Similarly, the court in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir.
1997) stated:
The jury system incorporated in our Constitution by the Framers was not intended
to satisfy yearnings for perfect knowledge of how a verdict is reached, nor to
provide assurances to the public of the primacy of logic in human affairs. Nor was
it subordinated to a "right to know" found in the First Amendment. The jury as we
know it is supposed to reach its decisions in the mystery and security of secrecy;
objections to the secrecy of jury deliberations are nothing less than objections to
the jury system itself.
(emphasis in original). But see Tanner, 483 U.S. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
the opinion of the Court):
The Court acknowledges that "postverdict investigation into juror misconduct
would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after
irresponsible or improper jury behavior," but maintains that "[i]t is not at all clear
... that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it." Petitioners are not
asking for a perfect jury. They are seeking to determine whether the jury that
heard their case behaved in a manner consonant with the minimum requirements
of the Sixth Amendment. If we deny them this opportunity, the jury system may
survive, but the constitutional guarantee on which it is based will become
meaningless.
(citations omitted).
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jurors were permitted to testify as to what happened in the jury room., 39
Concern for the ability of the jury to function in this context is
inextricably linked to judicial intervention (at trial or on appeal) and not
with public scrutiny of verdicts themselves, which will continue unabated
even without a postverdict right of access. 4° This concern for the finality of
verdicts is not compromised by postverdict public access to jury
deliberations-where scrutiny will not lead to trial challenges or post-trial
litigation. On the contrary, knowledge that a limited right of access
attaches-with the accompanying public scrutiny-might enhance both
jurors' seriousness and commitment to service as well as the public's
commitment to the central and solemn function of the jury in our system of
justice.
In addition to the common law doctrine restricting juror
impeachment, the courts have long recognized a freestanding commitment
to jury secrecy during the deliberative process. This tradition has been
incorporated in both statutes and judicial canons restricting the presence of
individuals (nonjurors or alternates) and recording devices in the jury
room.4' In addition, the commitment to jury secrecy is reflected in judicial
pronouncements founded upon broad policy concerns: (1) the need to
assure full and frank discussion in the jury room, 42 (2) to prevent
harassment of or retaliation against jurors from both losing parties and
39. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915). The Court stated:
[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into
court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry
in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding.
Id. However, in Clark, the Court stated:
Assuming that there is a privilege which protects from impertinent exposure the
arguments and ballots of a juror while considering his verdict, we think the
privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth to it has been fraudulently
begun or fraudulently continued. Other exceptions may have to be made in other
situations not brought before us now.
289 U.S. at 13-14.
40. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 124 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), which
asserted that "[j]urors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be
scrutinized in post-trial litigation.").
41., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) provides that alternate jurors are to be excused at the
commencement of deliberation. However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 737 (1993), held that deviation from this provision, and allowing jurors to sit in
the jury room without deliberating, did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. See
also McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268 (recognizing that while limiting access to the jury room
may "exclude the only possible evidence of misconduct, a change in the rule would open the
door to the most pernicious arts and tampering with jurors. The practice would be replete
with dangerous consequences. It would lead to the grossest fraud and abuse and no verdict
would be safe.") (citations omitted).
42. Clark, 289 U.S. at 13.
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other aggrieved members of the public,43 and (3) to preserve the
community's trust in a system that relies on juries to mete out justice.44
Again, the concern that jury speech will be chilled flows from the
influence that a recording device or alternate presence might have had, and
not on the effect created by the knowledge of limited access (anonymously
configured) to jury deliberations. In this sense, "the primary if not
exclusive purpose of jury privacy and secrecy is to protect the jury's
deliberations from improper influence.A5 Whether postverdict
dissemination of a jury transcript (anonymously configured) will have
prejudicial impact is questionable; whether that concern is as weighty as
the public's right to know is doubtful. Furthermore, this calculus must also
include the likelihood that postverdict public scrutiny will actually improve
the content of jury deliberations through increased public knowledge and
respect for the jury process.
The concerns that individual jurors might be harassed are not distinct
or persuasive in this context. Indeed, "generalized social claims should not
bear upon a decision whether limitations should be placed upon the press's
ability to have post-trial access to jurors." 6 As to aggrieved parties, trial
courts have limited power to curtail the speech of judicial officers.47
Further, trial courts cannot silence requests to individual jurors for
postverdict interviews.48 Harassment from aggrieved members of the public
can be minimized through release of transcripts that do not identify jurors
by name. In particularly high profile or other special cases, and subject to
the balancing test for closure of judicial proceedings generally, the right of
access may be subordinated to absolute juror privacy. Given that juror
anonymity itself is only rarely upheld, such instances of closure will be
43. If privacy did not inhere, "U]urors would be harassed and beset by the defeated
party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct."
McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267.
44. See Part I, supra.
45. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737-38. In this sense the Court's scrutiny is focused on
"prejudicial impact." Id. at 738. Cf Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 124 (7th Cir.
1981) (because "the privacy of jury deliberations is so essential to the 'substance of the jury
trial guarantee[,]' .. . when strangers are permitted to intrude upon such privacy, an error of
constitutional dimension is committed.") (quoting Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138
(1979)).
46. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3rd Cir. 1994).
47. See generally Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ("[D]isciplinary rules
governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment.");
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (arguing that any prior restraint on
speech in the context of a criminal trial bears a "heavy burden" of justification).
48. See, e.g., Antar, 38 F.3d at 1363 (stating that the right of access attaches and "[t]he
court must articulate findings of the actual expectation of an unwarranted intrusion upon
juror deliberations or of a probability of harassment of jurors beyond what the jurors, rather
than what a particular judge, may deem to be acceptable.").
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similarly rare. Indeed, the fact that juror anonymity is so rarely imposed
and upheld is evidence both of the importance of the right of access, and
that arguments for juror privacy are unavailing-the system is not designed
to provide postverdict privacy. 49
The concern for the jurors' privacy has historically been confined to
the deliberative process. Access to information after that process is
complete implicates that concern for privacy only to the extent that this
postverdict access might influence the deliberative process. As noted
previously, because this concern is both unsubstantiated and highly
speculative, it should give way to the public's right to know. In other
words, society owns the verdict after it has been rendered. The verdict is a
proxy for justice, and the public has a right to know whether and how
justice was done in the individual case.
III. No DANGER: ABSOLUTE JURY PRIVACY IS A RELIC
The primary danger of a postverdict right of access to jury
deliberations is that the transcript might become a vehicle for disturbing
jury verdicts or appellate litigation. In this sense, right of access would
become a threat "to the jury system itself."50 This slippery slope argument
posits that any inquiry into jury deliberations will inevitably lead to judicial
review of those jury deliberations and destabilize the entire foundation of
the jury system. 5' Unarticulated, but implicit in this formulation, is that any
scrutiny of jury deliberations is likely to uncover widespread misconduct
and incompetence. Whether such fear is warranted is debatable, but the
49. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 2004) (attaching right of access to
voir dire proceedings; subjecting closure to strict scrutiny; publishing the transcript later is
irrelevant). This approach is consistent with an historical examination of juror privacy in the
context of early American society-where neighbors in relatively confined communities
were keenly aware of who was serving on the jury. See, e.g., David Weinstein, Protecting a
Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 30 (1997) ("Jurors in the early days of this republic were selected from within small
communities, and shielding their identity simply was not possible."); see also infra note 52
and accompanying text.
50. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2nd Cir. 1997).
51. See generally Goldstein, supra, note 28, at 313-14 ("If we let the genie out of the
bottle, we probably will be unable to put it back again."). Goldstein goes on to suggest that
"[o]nce the inscrutability principle has gone, the time has come to set up another kind of
tribunal." Id. at 314 (quoting William R. Cornish, TIm JuRY 258 (1968)). See also Abraham
Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An Unnecessary and
Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 865, 881 (1996) ("[T]aped deliberations may indeed
reveal jury misconduct or discussion of extraneous factors, but they also open the door to a
stream of potential litigation .. "). But see Ruprecht, supra note 2 (arguing that limited
judicial review should follow from a right of access to jury deliberations, thus improving
our determination of error in the courtroom and the public confidence in the system
thereby).
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proposition that we should avoid excavation, because we are likely to dig
up evidence that calls into question our current method for administering
justice, is unsupportable as a matter of democratic principle. If the effect is
to undermine public confidence in the jury, that effect should be welcomed.
We might then begin to consider and institute a remedy for this erosion of
confidence, if such a remedy is not self-generating through the process of
transparency itself.
A reflexive citation to the ancient common law tradition of jury
secrecy is also an insufficient response. Any discussion of postverdict
access to jury deliberations must acknowledge both the changing nature of
privacy,52 the diffuseness of modem American society, as well as an
increasing alienation and mistrust of the jury process. In this sense, an
unexplored and rigid adherence to jury secrecy fails to even address
whether such access might, in fact, increase accountability and trust for our
judicial institutions.
The rationale for this historical preservation of juror secrecy is that
any contemporaneous access to jury deliberations might affect free debate
within the jury room, thus distorting the process and jeopardizing the fair
administration of justice. Of course, this blanket prohibition is completely
anathematic to our approach to accessing governmental, particularly
judicial, deliberations generally, where case by case scrutiny (adjudication)
is undertaken to determine whether those particular proceedings need to be
closed. Furthermore, there is only a "generalized social claim'' 53 of
prejudicial effect to justify frustrating access. This is an empty and untested
hypothesis on balance, and in the absence of empirical evidence, this claim
must be subordinated to the public right of access.
The final rationale for jury secrecy is that the release of jury
deliberation will compromise juror safety. As an initial matter, juror
anonymity is provided for only in cases where a real threat has been
identified.54 Furthermore, absent identifiable, special circumstances which
52. It also seems clear that the public enjoyed a level of access to juries at early
American common law unheard of to contemporary society. Jurors then were actually
neighbors, local figures, etc. who were well known to each other. Indeed, jury lists were
presumptively available-consistent with the relative size of those communities and the free
flow of information within those communities regarding judicial proceedings. See, e.g., In re
Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) ("When the jury system grew up with
juries of the vicinage, everybody knew everybody on the jury . .
53. See Antar, 38 F.3d at 1363.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
empanelling of an anonymous jury for a Mexican mafia RICO case); United States v.
Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding district court's decision to empanel
anonymous jury and to prohibit media access to information after the verdict had been
rendered); United States v. 77 E. 3rd St., 849 F. Supp. 876, 878-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("History of violence" warranted empanelling anonymous jury in civil forfeiture case to
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would change the entire calculus, a postverdict right of access to
anonymously configured jury deliberations would, standing alone, appear
to be less likely to compromise juror safety than pretrial publication of
jurors' identities."
Again, nothing in this theory of access precludes the balancing test
already employed with regard to closure of trial proceedings or
empanelling of anonymous juries. Postverdict access to jury deliberations
would be presumed, but upon specific findings that such access
compromised juror safety or the right of the defendant to a fair trial, access
could be denied. As with the other dangers identified above, juror safety is
already implicated in the right of access to trial proceedings, and extending
that right of access to include postverdict release of transcripts of jury
deliberations (anonymously configured) does not inherently increase the
risks identified.
Current invasions into jury secrecy clearly subvert many of the claims
made by opponents of a postverdict right of access to jury deliberations. 6
Indeed, many proponents of jury secrecy have already identified these
intrusions as an irreparable affront to the common law tradition.57 As noted
above, the narrowly tailored limitations on anonymous juries are one
indication that our concern for juror privacy must be balanced against a
right of access. In addition, the incidence of postverdict interviews already
provides an opportunity to scrutinize the content of jury deliberations.
Furthermore, if a record existed and was publicly available, the media
would have less incentive to interview or harass jurors, and the financial
incentive for jurors to engage in postverdict interviews would be mooted. 58
protect jurors from retaliation by Hell's Angels). These cases make clear that empanelling
anonymous juries is contingent on identifiable risk to juror safety-based on threats,
conduct of the defendant, or history of intimidation.
55. That the media will pore over these transcripts and be able to identify and
distinguish individual jurors would be nothing new-postverdict interviews with jurors
already facilitate such scrutiny. In addition, this concern is only present in high-profile cases
where special circumstances might weigh toward jury anonymity. More traditional media
and scholars seeking to demystify and understand the jury process will utilize transcripts
from lower profile cases. In this way, by force of repetition and scholarship, the jury process
will become both demystified and more mundane, but still accountable, and less subject to
publicity. Indeed, the majority of the records that would be synthesized and reported on
have little else but scholarly, judicial, and historical value.
56. Not taken up here, but also relevant to inroads into absolute jury secrecy, is the
increasing discretionary practice of allowing individual jurors to ask questions via the trial
court judge of the various witnesses. See, e.g., IND. JURY R. 20(7) (stating that jurors may
seek to ask questions of witnesses by submitting those questions in writing). See also State
v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio 2003) (on the propiety of juror questions); Commonwealth
v. Britto, 744 N.E.2d 1089 (Mass. 2001) (discussing the propriety of juror questions).
57. See generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 51; Goldstein, supra note 28.
58. 1 do not mean to suggest that a limited right of access would completely moot the
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Ultimately, the prevalence of postverdict interviews itself suggests: (1) a
weakening public concern for juror privacy, (2) a correlative increase in
public interest in jury deliberations, and (3) a need for access to jury
deliberations to increase public confidence in the institution and for the
"community therapeutic value" that flows from the gathering and
dissemination of information.
IV. PARAMETERS FOR A POSTVERDICT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
JURY DELIBERATIONS
Once the right of access attaches, parameters for release of a
transcript of jury deliberations can be tailored to address realistic concerns
for juror privacy. As an initial matter, postverdict release coupled with an
absolute prohibition against use of transcripts for litigation purposes 59
address most of the historical and policy concerns for juror secrecy.
Primarily, juror secrecy was intended for the actual process by which juries
reach their verdict.60 This concern is evident in common law doctrine
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their own verdict.61 Postverdict release
insures that juror safety, which is already implicated by the right of access
to jury lists, is not further compromised. Protestations that speech will
nevertheless be chilled are a general societal claim lacking an evidentiary
foundation. The implied postverdict right of access that inhered in early
American society62 casts further doubt on the legitimacy of this claim.63
Secondly, transcripts of jury deliberations can be configured without
identifying individual jurors by name, thus serving as an additional
safeguard against potential postverdict harassment or retaliation. This
parameter is also consistent with the Fifth Circuit's dictum that prohibiting
desire or hysteria concerning postverdict interviews with jurors, more that the form of such
access would mitigate and counterbalance the hysterical access characterized currently by
the sensationalism of postverdict interviews. Indeed, the prevalence of such interviews
reinforces the point made above: jury privacy is no longer sacrosanct. Further, and more
importantly, creating a limited right of access, while not stemming the hysteria, would offer
a countervailing and more solemn and academic approach to assessing jury performance.
This argument then flows back into my secondary thesis: that access in this format may
have the result of increasing respect for and understanding of the jury process.
59. Prohibiting the use of transcripts for posttrial litigation or verdict inquiry also works
to preserve the common law doctrine against the impeachment of jury verdicts. If an
absolute prohibition against such use of jury transcripts was instituted, no concern regarding
possible impeachment is availing.
60. See Goldstein, supra note 28, at 299-300 n.19 (discussing the critical "relationship
between secrecy and finality").
61. See, e.g., Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785) (opinion by Lord
Mansfield) (refusing to accept into evidence the affidavits of jurors to show they had arrived
at their verdict by lot); see Wigmore, supra, note 33.
62. See Weinstein, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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disclosure of "the ballots of individual jurors" is a "paramount value." 64
Again, the limited right of access should not be viewed as an extension or
further invasion of jury secrecy. These invasions already occur, albeit in a
less vital and more perverse way. In this sense, a postverdict right of access
to jury deliberations might actually enhance the public debate on the jury
process, providing a mechanism for informed and circumspect evaluation
of that process.
Finally, the parameters that would justify postverdict closure of the
jury transcript can be assessed on a case-by-case basis, subject to the same
balancing used to assess access to judicial proceedings generally. Arguably
the contexts in which such closure might be justified are more numerous
with regard to jury privacy; case law development can address these
circumstances. As elsewhere, "any privilege of access to governmental
information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the
information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. 65
The attachment of the right of access means that the values that inhere in
the structural model are observed-a respect for "th[ose] process[es] of
communication necessary for a democracy to survive..."66
Against the argument for absolute jury secrecy, with its attendant
fear-mongering and blind adherence to dated mantras, lies a conception of
access to jury deliberations as an "indispensable condition[] of meaningful
communication" about the American justice system.67 The increasing
incidence of sensationalistic postverdict interviews with jurors, themselves
uninformed and lacking meaning, has already unalterably pierced the veil
of juror secrecy. 68 What is needed is reasonable access to these
deliberations, not to perfect the jury system, but to generate and foster
informed debate and serious reflection on that deliberative body. Contrary
to opponents' speculations, a right of access to jury deliberations, in text
and anonymously configured, is more likely to lead, not down the slippery
slope, but to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ' 69 public dialogue
regarding the jury process and, finally, a renewed sense of public
commitment to the solemnity of jury duty.
64. In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Goldstein, supra
note 28, at 304.
65. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 588.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., William R. Bagley, Jr., Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to Unlock
the Door?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 481,500-01 (1999).
69. N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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V. POSTSCRIPT: CAMERAS IN THE JURY ROOM?
As with cameras in the courtroom, future developments in recording
jury deliberations for postverdict dissemination should proceed subject to
judicial discretion and the dual concerns for jury privacy and defendants'
right to a fair trial. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes v. Texas is
instructive: "[T]he day may come when television will have become so
commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate
all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the
judicial process. 7°
Indeed, "[t]he law [] favors publicity in legal proceedings, so far as
that object can be attained without injustice to the persons immediately
concerned."'', In these developments, the lower and state courts should
serve as laboratories-as long as the state action does not infringe upon
constitutional guarantees, the states must be permitted to experiment.72
Similarly, the common law of judicial discretion should govern these
experiments. The trial judge, through grant of jurisdiction, is generally
charged with the maintenance of order within her own courtroom. In this
regard, the judge has both inherent power and broad discretion over control
of judicial proceedings. For example, a judge may authorize presence of
cameras in the courtroom over an objection by the defendant, unless the
defendant makes a showing that the presence of those cameras will be
prejudicial.73 Similar discretion, mindful of a tradition of jury secrecy,
would inhere in the discretion whether to record jury deliberations for
future dissemination.
The following parameters for audiovisual recording of jury
deliberations could mitigate the constitutional concern for defendants' fair-
trial rights as well as the common law tradition providing for juror secrecy.
First, defendants would need to waive objection to the recording,
70. 381 U.S. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also supra note 22 and accompanying
text. Cf Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575, where the Court stated:
The risk of juror prejudice is present in any publication of a trial, but the
appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to
demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case ... compromised the ability of
the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly.
71. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542. (citation omitted).
72. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id.
73. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575.
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precluding them from using the fact or product of recorded deliberations as
a mechanism for challenging a verdict or for pursuing appeal.74 Second, a
jury would be empanelled without knowledge that their deliberations would
be filmed. This protocol would insure that the jury composition would not
be skewed toward only those willing to seek out publicity.75
After empanelling the jury, each juror would be asked to approve the
unobtrusive placement of cameras in order to record their deliberations. If a
single juror objected at this point, then no recording devices would be
permitted. Finally, and assuming unanimous agreement to audiovisual
recording, each juror would retain a postverdict veto on release of the
audiovisual record. Each of these safeguards works to confirm juror
autonomy in the deliberative process.
74. This provision is premised on the notion, inherent in the right of access generally,
that it is the defendant who owns the right to a fair trial. Estes, 381 U.S. at 588 ("[T]he right
of 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the accused .... )
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also Gannet Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-388
(1979). While all parties have an interest in the fair administration of justice, only the
defendant's right should be able to trump the court's exercise of judicial discretion to permit
cameras in the jury room. But see State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. Crim
App. 2003) (prohibiting cameras in the jury room despite waiver by the defendant of use of
recording and agreement by all jurors to be taped).
75. Administrative Order, Docket No. SJC-228, 1996 Me. LEXIS 32 at *5 (Fed. 5,
1996) (Glassman & Ridnman, JJ., statement in nonconcurrence) ("Selection of only those
jurors who do not mind thinking out loud before millions of observers, or those who will
serve but in silence, by its nature will distort the jury's deliberative process.").
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